Communication & Crisis Essay

Many disasters happen around us that we have no control over, nor do we know what the impact will be of these disasters long term and short term. On the environment surrounding us as well as what it may do to our health. Working as the director of health for my region it is my job to stay on top of such issues. Keeping an eye out for such emergencies that may endanger us in our everyday living space and most of all our health. I want to go through how I might deal with such situations and how I would address it head on. While at the same time keeping the public informed without overwhelming them as well as looking at who I would collaborate with to make this situation resolve in the smoothest and best way possible. The issue that has come to my attention is water contamination in a certain area. This contamination is life threatening and needs to be acknowledged and dealt with accurately and promptly. As I am the director of emergency health situations I see myself and the mediator and problem solver between the public (people) and media. Those two things are there for each other but if you are not too careful they can harm each other; giving out too much information or not enough or sometimes the wrong information can be harmful to all parties involved. Having such a situation on had you need to talk to the right people and receive all the right information. I would first go to the areas that have been affected and gather all the proper data and forms that show what chemicals are incorrect causing this contamination. I need this information for hard copy evidence so when I contact the media or speak in public I will have all the proper information. I will also get the CDC involved if they are not already involved. They will be conducting the proper tests and research to discover what the contaminated bacteria is. They will also have the proper protocol in containing it, as well as seeing the damage it has done to people who have ingested it and come in contact  with it. Finding an antidote will be another task they will have. In such a situation you will also get in contact with the proper news channels; national and local. Having my statements ready giving the media and public the help and information that they need. Communicating in any situation has its advantages and setbacks. Working in such a high pace and high stress industry makes communication that much more important and not to mention difficult. Being in the health care industry means you work and deal with a lot of the same people consistently. This at times can be a good thing. You build relationships with them you become accountable to one another, you even learn each other’s communications styles; you become comfortable with them, in some cases they even become your second family. Having that crutch that comfort in such a high stress and high demand career is needed. As I said befor you become accountable to one another and the team work/bond is unbreakable unparalleled. This kind of bond is desperately needed in such careers. Especially when you are dealing with millions of people’s lives, they always count on me as director of emergency health. Providing them with the best and most accurate information, help and solution to our health care crisis, that is no easy task and I cannot do it on my own. I use me organizations from the inside and outside; to give my best and keep our environment safe and clean. This same relationship is needed in any high profile type of career i.e. chief of medicine of a hospital the president of the United States. They all need to have great communication skills with their organizations and network of people. On the other side of the spectrum you can have communication issues that can do more damage than the crisis itself. You not only need to have basic communication skills with your staff and organizations but as we just finished discussing a great understanding and relationship with each other. If someone in the organizations you deal with miscommunicate on purpose for their own personal gain, whether that be to give themselves an advantage or just to give you a disadvantage, that may hinder your ability to protect yourself and the issue you are trying to solve. Giving you more steps to complete, possibly even making you back track. Making sure you have a good relationship and communication relationship with all the organizations you  deal with inside your office and outside is key. Even if you only deal with them occasionally or if you deal with them on a regular basis. Communicating in a non-crisis situation verses a crisis situation can have its differences. The main importance is no matter the situation your communication should be using the basic knowledge of conversing. Communication in a non-crisis is a little more relaxed, yes you still have things to get across to each other and they are somewhat important; but for the most part your emotions are not running high you have yourself composed and thinking rationally. The stakes aren’t usually as high it’s not a life or heath situation. A crisis situation the emotions are running high, you are frazzled thinking a million miles a minute. Dealing with this type of communication crisis at work should be handled with a calm clear and patient mind frame. We obviously know listening is key in any situation especially a crisis situation. I tend to be the listener when it comes to these situations and just in general. Most likely you will have most of the people in the room (people dealing with the crisis) trying to do the talking and not listening and we know communication is not just talking. I’ve learned from experience that you need to be understanding and patient with everyone in the situation, if you want to get anywhere with solving the issue or just communicating what you mean you need to take a minute and just breathe. Personally I have been in such similar situations before and it really makes a difference if you are the one with a cool head. This way of dealing with things can go for a non-health care setting and a health care setting. I am going to give you a personal story that just so happens to be in a health care setting. About 5 years ago my grandmother was hospitalized she had leukemia and lung cancer as well as a case of pneumonia which is why she went to the hospital. While at the hospital she was infected with MRSA. Once she was diagnosed with MRSA our family went into crisis mode because the doctors told us the prognosis was not good at all. She basically had maybe weeks to live. She was put on life support hoping the MRSA was clearing up and my uncles went into their â€Å"communication mode†. There are 7 brothers including my father and they are all stubborn Armenian men who have the worste communication skills ever. The wives know not to get involved too much because if was their mothers life hanging in the balance;  and none of them have any medical background to really understand what is going on and if they should pull the plug of keep her alive with the machines. As we all know doctors can only tell you so much, my sister and I are the listeners of the family and we are the vice of reason when it comes to most anything. We both just so happen to be the only two with medical backgrounds I am a nurse and she is in her medical resid ency. We had to use our knowledge and better communication skills to inform them and really show them that my grandmother was not coming out of this after we had our what I call â€Å"crisis family meeting† they decided to pull the plug that evening and my grandmother passed. In any situation whether it be medical, personal or work related communication is the same. Something that we are just now getting comfortable using in everyday life as well as crisis situations is modern technology for communicating. This is a useful tool that we still need to learn how to properly use it in such crisis situations. Sending out mass email and text messages to keep the public informed, is one of the best ways we can use social media to alert the public of ever changing crisis management issues. This has just recently eveolved into something we use in this capacity. When hurricane Katrina hit we still only used news and it was a â€Å"wow† new idea to check in with loved one over facebook and twitter because all other forms of communication such as phones were down. How 5-10 years makes a world of differences. Finishing off this paper about communicating during a crisis and how you might communicate during a non-crisis be different. How you should and could deal with people that you need to communicate during a crisis. How it really is important and how much of a new role social media is playing in crisis management. Writing this paper really made me think about how important it is to properly communicate with each other whether it’s for work or social. Being a good communicator is a bog key in all parts of life. References de Pre , A. (2005). Communicating about health: current issues and perspectives. : The Mcgraw-Hill. Fulk, J., Schmitz, J., & Ryu, D. (1995, February ). Congnative elements in social construction of communication technology.Manegment Communication Quarterly , 8(3).

Against and for Capital Punishment

SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM IS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT MORALLY REQUIRED? ACTS, OMISSIONS, AND LIFELIFE TRADEOFFS Cass R. Sunstein* and Adrian Vermeule** Many people believe that the death penalty should be abolished even if, as recent evidence seems to suggest, it has a significant deterrent effect. But if such an effect can be established, capital punishment requires a life-life tradeoff, and a serious commitment to the sanctity of human life may well compel, rather than forbid, that form of punishment.The familiar problems with capital punishment— potential error, irreversibility, arbitrariness, and racial skew—do not require abolition because the realm of homicide suffers from those same problems in even more acute form. Moral objections to the death penalty frequently depend on a sharp distinction between acts and omissions, but that distinction is misleading in this context because government is a special kind of moral agent.The widespr ead failure to appreciate the life-life tradeoffs potentially involved in capital punishment may depend in part on cognitive processes that fail to treat â€Å"statistical lives† with the seriousness that they deserve. The objection to the act/omission distinction, as applied to government, has implications for many questions in civil and criminal law. INTRODUCTION†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦ 704 I. EVIDENCE †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦. 10 II. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: MORAL FOUNDATIONS AND FOUR OBJECTIONS †¦ 716 A. Morality and Death†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢ € ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.. 717 B. Acts and Omissions †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.. 719 1. Is the act/omission distinction coherent with respect to government?†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦. 720 * Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, the University of Chicago Law School, Department of PoliticalScience, and the College. ** Bernard D. Meltzer Professor of Law, the University of Chicago. The authors thank Larry Alexander, Ron Allen, Richard Berk, Steven Calabresi, Jeffrey Fagan, Robert Hahn, Dan Kahan, Andy Koppelman, Richard Lempert, Steven Levitt, James Liebman, Daniel Markel, Frank Michelman, Tom Miles, Eric Posner, Richard Posner, Joanna Shepherd, William Stuntz, James Sullivan, and Eugene Volokh for helpful suggestions, and Blake Roberts for excellent research assistance and valuable comments.Thanks too to participants in a work-in-progress lunch at the University of Chicago Law School and a constitutional theory workshop at Northwestern University Law School. 703 SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM 704 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:703 2. Is the act/omission distinction morally relevant to capital punishment? †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦. 724 C. The Arbitrary and Discriminatory Realm of Homicide†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.. 728 D. Preferable Alternatives and the Principle of Strict Scrutiny†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦ 32 E. Slipper y Slopes †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦ 734 F. Deontology and Consequentialism Again†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.. 737 III. COGNITION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦ 740 A. Salience †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.. 741 B. Acts, Omissions, and Brains†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦. 741 C. A Famous Argument that Might Be Taken as a Counterargument †¦.. 743 IV.IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE PROBLEMS †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦ 744 A. Threshold Effects (? ) and Regional Variation †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦ 745 B. International Variation †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.. 745 C. Offenders and Offenses †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.. 746 D. Life-Life Tradeoffs and Beyond†¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦.. 747 CONCLUSION †¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦Ã¢â‚¬ ¦ 48 INTRODUCTION Many people believe that capital punishment is morally impermissible. In their view, executions are inherently cruel and barbaric. 1 Often they add that capital punishment is not, and cannot be, imposed in a way that adheres to the rule of law. 2 They contend that, as administered, capital punishment ensures the execution of (some) innocent people and also that it reflects arbitrariness, in the form of random or invidious infliction of the ultimate penalty. 3 Defenders of capital punishment can be separated into two different camps.Some are retributivists. 4 Following Immanuel Kant,5 they claim that for the most heinous forms of wrongdoing, the penalty of death is morally justified or perhaps even required. Other defenders of capital punishment are consequentialists and often also welfarists. 6 They contend that the deterrent 1. See, e. g. , Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 309, 371 (1972) (Marshall, J. , concurring). 2. See Stephen B. Bright, Why the United States Will Join the Rest of the World in Abandoning Capital Punishment, in DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY: SHOULD AMERICA HAVE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT? 52 (Hugo Adam Bedau & Paul G. Cassell eds. , 2004) [hereinafter DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY]. 3. See, e. g. , James S. Liebman et al. , A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995 (Columbia Law Sch. , Pub. Law Research Paper No. 15, 2000) (on file with authors). 4. See, e. g. , Luis P. Pojman, Why the Death Penalty Is Morally Permissible, in DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 2, at 51, 55-58. 5. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT 198 (W.Hastrie trans. , 1887) (1797). 6. Arguments along these lines can be found in Pojman, supra note 4, at 58-73. SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM December 2005] IS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT MORALLY REQUIRED? 705 effect of capital punishment is significant and that it justifies the infliction of the ultimate penalty. Consequentialist defenses of capital punishment, however, tend to assume that capital punishment is (merely) morally permissible, as opposed to being morally obligatory.Our goal here is to suggest that the debate over capital punishment is rooted in an unquestioned assumption and that the failure to question that assumption is a serious moral error. The assumption is that for governments, acts are morally different from omissions. We want to raise the possibility that an indefensible form of the act/omission distinction is crucial to some of the most prominent objections to capital punishment—and that defenders of capital punishment, apparently making the same distinction, have failed to notice that according to the logic of their theory, capital punishment is morally obligatory, not just permissible.We suggest, in other words, tha t on certain empirical assumptions, capital punishment may be morally required, not for retributive reasons, but rather to prevent the taking of innocent lives. 7 The suggestion bears not only on moral and political debates, but also on constitutional questions. In invalidating the death penalty for juveniles, for example, the Supreme Court did not seriously engage the possibility that capital punishment for juveniles may help to prevent the death of innocents, including juvenile innocents. And if our suggestion is correct, it relates to many questions outside of the context of capital punishment. If omissions by the state are often indistinguishable, in principle, from actions by the state, then a wide range of apparent failures to act—in the context not only of criminal and civil law, but of regulatory law as well—should be taken to raise serious moral and legal problems. Those who accept our arguments in favor of the death penalty may or may not welcome the implicat ions for government action in general.In many situations, ranging from environmental quality to appropriations to highway safety to relief of poverty, our arguments suggest that in light of 7. In so saying, we are suggesting the possibility that states are obliged to maintain the death penalty option, not that they must inflict that penalty in every individual case of a specified sort; hence we are not attempting to enter into the debate over mandatory death sentences, as invalidated in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978), and Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 (1976). For relevant discussion, see Martha C.Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83 (1993). 8. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). Here is the heart of the Court’s discussion: As for deterrence, it is unclear whether the death penalty has a significant or even measurable deterrent effect on juveniles, as counsel for the petitioner acknowledged at oral argument. . . . [T]he absence of evidenc e of deterrent effect is of special concern because the same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence. . . To the extent the juvenile death penalty might have residual deterrent effect, it is worth noting that the punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is itself a severe sanction, in particular for a young person. Id. at 1196. These are speculations at best, and they do not engage with the empirical literature; of course, that literature does not dispose of the question whether juveniles are deterred by the death penalty. SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM 06 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:703 imaginable empirical findings, government is obliged to provide far more protection than it now does, and it should not be permitted to hide behind unhelpful distinctions between acts and omissions. The foundation for our argument is a significant bod y of recent evidence that capital punishment may well have a deterrent effect, possibly a quite powerful one. 9 A leading national study suggests that each execution prevents some eighteen murders, on average. 0 If the current evidence is even roughly correct—a question to which we shall return—then a refusal to impose capital punishment will effectively condemn numerous innocent people to death. States that choose life imprisonment, when they might choose capital punishment, are ensuring the deaths of a large number of innocent people. 11 On moral grounds, a choice that effectively condemns large numbers of people to death seems objectionable to say the least.For those who are inclined to be skeptical of capital punishment for moral reasons—a group that includes one of the current authors—the task is to consider the possibility that the failure to impose capital punishment is, prima facie and all things considered, a serious moral wrong. Judgments of thi s sort are often taken to require a controversial commitment to a consequentialist view about the foundations of moral evaluation. One of our principal points, however, is that the choice between consequentialist and deontological approaches to morality is not crucial here.We suggest that, on certain empirical assumptions, theorists of both stripes might converge on the idea that capital punishment is morally obligatory. On 9. See, e. g. , Hashem Dezhbakhsh et al. , Does Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 344 (2003); H. Naci Mocan & R. Kaj Gittings, Getting Off Death Row: Commuted Sentences and the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 46 J. L. & ECON. 453, 453 (2003); Joanna M. Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization: Capital Punishment’s Differing Impacts Among States, 104 MICH. L. REV. 03 (2005) [hereinafter Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization]; Joanna M. Shepherd, Murders of Passion, Exe cution Delays, and the Deterrence of Capital Punishment, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 308 (2004) [hereinafter Shepherd, Murders of Passion]; Paul R. Zimmerman, Estimates of the Deterrent Effect of Alternative Execution Methods in the United States, 65 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. (forthcoming 2006) [hereinafter Zimmerman, Alternative Execution Methods], available at http://papers. ssrn. com/sol3/papers. cfm? abstract_id=355783; Paul R. Zimmerman, State Executions, Deterrence, and the Incidence of Murder, 7 J. APPLIED ECON. 63, 163 (2004) [hereinafter Zimmerman, State Executions]. 10. See Dezhbakhsh et al. , supra note 9, at 344. In what follows, we will speak of each execution saving eighteen lives in the United States, on average. We are, of course, suppressing many issues in that formulation, simply for expository convenience. For one thing, that statistic is a national average, as we emphasize in Part IV. For another thing, future research might find that capital punishment has diminishing retu rns: even if the first 100 executions deter 1800 murders, it does not follow that another 1000 executions will deter another 18,000 murders.We will take these and like qualifications as understood in the discussion that follows. 11. In recent years, the number of murders in the United States has fluctuated between 15,000 and 24,000. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES tbl. 1 (2003), available at http://www. fbi. gov/ucr/03cius. htm. SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM December 2005] IS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT MORALLY REQUIRED? 707 consequentialist grounds, the death penalty seems morally obligatory if it is the only or most effective means of preventing significant numbers of murders; much of our discussion will explore this point.For this reason, consequentialists should have little difficulty with our arguments. For deontologists, a killing is a wrong under most circumstances, and its wrongness does not depend on its consequences or its ef fects on overall welfare. Many deontologists (of course not all) believe that capital punishment counts as a moral wrong. But in the abstract, any deontological injunction against the wrongful infliction of death turns out to be indeterminate on the moral status of capital punishment if the death is necessary to prevent significant numbers of killings.The unstated assumption animating much opposition to capital punishment among intuitive deontologists is that capital punishment counts as an â€Å"action† by the state, while the refusal to impose it counts as an â€Å"omission,† and that the two are altogether different from the moral point of view. A related way to put this point is to suggest that capital punishment counts as a â€Å"killing,† while the failure to impose capital punishment counts as no such thing and hence is far less problematic on moral grounds. We shall investigate these claims in some detail.But we doubt that the distinction between state a ctions and state omissions can bear the moral weight given to it by the critics of capital punishment. Whatever its value as a moral concept where individuals are concerned, the act/omission distinction misfires in the general setting of government regulation. If government policies fail to protect people against air pollution, occupational risks, terrorism, or racial discrimination, it is inadequate to put great moral weight on the idea that the failure to act is a mere â€Å"omission. No one believes that government can avoid responsibility to protect people against serious dangers—for example, by refusing to enforce regulatory statutes—simply by contending that such refusals are unproblematic omissions. 12 If state governments impose light penalties on offenders or treat certain offenses (say, domestic violence) as unworthy of attention, they should not be able to escape public retribution by contending that they are simply refusing to act.Where government is conce rned, failures of protection, through refusals to punish and deter private misconduct, cannot be justified by pointing to the distinction between acts and omissions. It has even become common to speak of â€Å"risk-risk tradeoffs,† understood to arise when regulation of one risk (say, a risk associated with the use of DDT) gives rise to another risk (say, the spread of malaria, against which DDT has been effective). 13 Or suppose that an air pollutant creates adverse health effects 12.Indeed, agency inaction is frequently subject to judicial review. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Three-Branch Monte, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157 (1996). 13. See generally RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds. , 1995) (considering â€Å"risk-risk tradeoffs† on topics such as DDT, the use of estrogen for menopause, and clozapine theory SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM 708 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:703 ut also has health benefits, as appears to be the case for ground-level ozone. 14 It is implausible to say that, for moral reasons, social planners should refuse to take account of such tradeoffs; there is general agreement that whether a particular substance ought to be regulated depends on the overall effect of regulation on human well-being. As an empirical matter, criminal law is pervaded by its own risk-risk tradeoffs. When the deterrent signal works, a failure to impose stringent penalties on certain crimes will increase the number of those crimes.A refusal to impose such penalties is, for that reason, problematic from the moral point of view. It should not be possible for an official—a governor, for example—to attempt to escape political retribution for failing to prevent domestic violence or environmental degradation by claiming that he is simply â€Å"failing to act. † The very idea of â€Å"equal protection of the laws,† in its oldest and most literal sense, attests to the importance of enforcing the criminal and civil law so as to safeguard the potential victims of private violence. 5 What we are suggesting is that to the extent that capital punishment saves more lives than it extinguishes, the death penalty produces a risk-risk tradeoff of its own—indeed, what we will call a life-life tradeoff. Of course, the presence of a life-life tradeoff does not resolve the capital punishment debate. By itself, the act of execution may be a wrong, in a way that cannot be said of an act of imposing civil or criminal penalties for, say, environmental degradation.But the existence of life-life tradeoffs raises the possibility that for those who oppose killing, a rejection of capital punishment is not necessarily mandated. On the contrary, it may well be morally compelled. At the very least, those who object to capital punishment, and who do so in the name of protecting life, must come to terms with the possibility that th e failure to inflict capital punishment will fail to protect life—and must, in our view, justify their position in ways that do not rely on question-begging claims about the distinction between state actions and state omissions, or between killing and letting die.We begin, in Part I, with the facts. Raising doubts about widely held beliefs based on older studies or partial information, recent studies suggest that capital punishment may well save lives. One leading study finds that as a national average, each execution deters some eighteen murders. Our question whether capital punishment is morally obligatory is motivated by these findings; our central concern is that foregoing any given execution may be equivalent to condemning some unidentified people to a premature and violent death.Of course, social science can always be disputed in this contentious domain, and spirited attacks have been made on the recent studies;16 hence, we mean to for schizophrenia). 14. See Am. Trucki ng Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F. 3d 1027, 1051-53 (D. C. Cir. 1999). 15. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997). 16. See Richard Berk, New Claims About Executions and General Deterrence: Deja SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM December 2005] IS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT MORALLY REQUIRED? 709 outline, rather than to defend, the relevant evidence here.But we think that to make progress on the moral issues, it is productive and even necessary to take those findings as given and consider their significance. Those who would like to abolish capital punishment, and who find the social science unconvincing, might find it useful to ask whether they would maintain their commitment to abolition if they were firmly persuaded that capital punishment does have a strong deterrent effect. We ask such people to suspend their empirical doubts in order to investigate the moral issues that we mean to raise here.In Part II, the centerpiece of the Article, we offer a few remarks on moral foundations and examine some standard objections to capital punishment that might seem plausible even in light of the current findings. We focus in particular on the view that capital punishment is objectionable because it requires affirmative and intentional state â€Å"action,† not merely an â€Å"omission. † The act/omission distinction, we suggest, systematically misfires when applied to government, which is a moral agent with distinctive features.The act/omission distinction may not even be intelligible in the context of government, which always faces a choice among policy regimes, and in that sense cannot help but â€Å"act. † Even if the distinction between acts and omissions can be rendered intelligible in regulatory settings, its moral relevance is obscure. Some acts are morally obligatory, while some omissions are morally culpable. If capital punishment has significant deterrent effects, we suggest that for government to omit to impose it is morally blameworthy, even on a deontological account of morality.Deontological accounts typically recognize a consequentialist override to baseline prohibitions. If each execution saves an average of eighteen lives, then it is plausible to think that the override is triggered, in turn triggering an obligation to adopt capital punishment. Once the act/omission distinction is rejected where government is concerned, it becomes clear that the most familiar, and plausible, objections to capital punishment deal with only one side of the ledger: the objections fail to take account of the exceedingly arbitrary deaths that capital punishment may deter.The realm of homicide, as we shall call it, is replete with its own arbitrariness. We consider rule-of-law concerns about the irreversibility of capital punishment and its possibly random or invidious administration, a strict scrutiny principle that capital punishment should not be permitted if other means for producing the same le vel of deterrence are available, and concerns about slippery slopes. We suggest that while some of these complaints have Vu All over Again? , 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 03 (2005); see also Deterrence and the Death Penalty: A Critical Review of New Evidence: Hearings on the Future of Capital Punishment in the State of New York Before the New York State Assemb. Standing Comm. on Codes, Assemb. Standing Comm. on Judiciary, and Assemb. Standing Comm. on Correction, 2005 Leg. , 228th Sess. 1-12 (N. Y. 2005) (statement of Jeffrey Fagan, Professor of Law and Pub. Health, Columbia Univ. ), available at www. deathpenaltyinfo. org/FaganTestimony. pdf [hereinafter Deterrence and the Death Penalty].For a response to Fagan’s testimony, see generally Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization, supra note 9. SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM 710 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:703 merit, they do not count as decisive objections to capital punishment, because they emb ody a flawed version of the act/omission distinction and generally overlook the fact that the moral objections to capital punishment apply even more strongly to the murders that capital punishment apparently deters.In Part III, we conjecture that various cognitive and social mechanisms, lacking any claim to moral relevance, may cause many individuals and groups to subscribe to untenable versions of the distinction between acts and omissions or to discount the lifesaving potential of capital punishment while exaggerating the harms that it causes. An important concern here is a sort of misplaced concreteness, stemming from heuristics such as salience and availability. The single person executed is often more visible nd more salient in public discourse than any abstract statistical persons whose murders might be deterred by a single execution. If those people, and their names and faces, were highly visible, we suspect that many of the objections to capital punishment would at least be shaken. As environmentalists have often argued, â€Å"statistical persons† should not be treated as irrelevant abstractions. 17 The point holds for criminal justice no less than for pollution controls. Part IV expands upon the implications of our view and examines some unresolved puzzles.Here we emphasize that we hold no brief for capital punishment across all contexts or in the abstract. The crucial question is what the facts show in particular domains. We mean to include here a plea not only for continuing assessment of the disputed evidence, but also for a disaggregated approach. Future research and resulting policies would do well to take separate account of various regions and of various classes of offenders and offenses. We also emphasize that our argument is limited to the setting of life-life tradeoffs— in which the taking of a life by the state will reduce the number of lives taken overall.We express no view about cases in which that condition does not holdâ⠂¬â€for example, the possibility of capital punishment for serious offenses other than killing, with rape being the principal historical example, and with rape of children being a currently contested problem. Such cases involve distinctively difficult moral problems that we mean to bracket here. A brief conclusion follows. I. EVIDENCE For many years, the deterrent effect of capital punishment was sharply disputed. 18 In the 1970s, Isaac Ehrlich conducted the first multivariate 17. Lisa Heinzerling, The Rights of Statistical People, 24 HARV.ENVTL. L. REV. 189, 189 (2000). 18. Compare, e. g. , Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 397, 398 (1975) (estimating each execution deters eight murders), with William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich’s Research on Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L. J. 187, 187 (1975) (finding Ehrlich’s data and methods unreliable). A good over view is Robert Weisberg, The Death SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM December 2005] IS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT MORALLY REQUIRED? 711 egression analyses of the death penalty, based on time-series data from 1933 to 1967, and concluded that each execution deterred as many as eight murders. 19 But subsequent studies raised many questions about Ehrlich’s conclusions—by showing, for example, that the deterrent effects of the death penalty would be eliminated if data from 1965 through 1969 were eliminated. 20 It would be fair to say that the deterrence hypothesis could not be confirmed by the studies that have been completed in the twenty years after Ehrlich first wrote. 21 More recent evidence, however, has given new life to Ehrlich’s hypothesis. 2 A wave of sophisticated multiple regression studies have exploited a newly available form of data, so-called â€Å"panel data,† that uses all information from a set of units (states or counties ) and follows that data over an extended period of time. A leading study used county-level panel data from 3054 U. S. counties between 1977 and 1996. 23 The authors found that the murder rate is significantly reduced by both death sentences and executions. The most striking finding was that on average, each execution results in eighteen fewer murders. 24 Other econometric studies also find a substantial deterrent effect.In two papers, Paul Zimmerman uses state-level panel data from 1978 onwards to measure the deterrent effect of execution rates and execution methods. He estimates that each execution deters an average of fourteen murders. 25 Using state-level data from 1977 to 1997, H. Naci Mocan and R. Kaj Gittings find that each execution deters five murders on average. 26 They also find that increases in the murder rate result when people are removed from death row Penalty Meets Social Science: Deterrence and Jury Behavior Under New Scrutiny, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 151 (2005). 19.See Ehrlich, supra note 18, at 398; Isaac Ehrlich, Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Some Further Thoughts and Additional Evidence, 85 J. POL. ECON. 741 (1977). 20. For this point and an overview of many other criticisms of Ehrlich’s conclusions, see Richard O. Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1177 (1981). 21. See id. ; Weisberg, supra note 18, at 155-57. 22. Even as this evidence was being developed, one of us predicted, perhaps rashly, that the debate would remain inconclusive for the foreseeable future. See Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y. U. L. REV. 74, 100-01 (2000). 23. See Dezhbakhsh et al. , supra note 9, at 359. 24. Id. at 373. 25. Zimmerman, Alternative Execution Methods, supra note 9; Zimmerman, State Executions, supra note 9, at 190. 26. Mocan & Gittings, supra note 9, at 453. Notably, no clear evidence of a deterrent effect from capital punishment emerges from L awrence Katz et al. , Prison Conditions, Capital Punishment, and Deterrence, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 318, 330 (2003), which finds that the estimate of deterrence is extremely sensitive to the choice of specification, with the largest estimate paralleling that in Ehrlich, supra note 18.Note, however, that the principal finding in Katz et al. , supra, is that prison deaths do have a strong deterrent effect and a stunningly large one—with each prison death producing a reduction of â€Å"30-100 violent crimes and a similar number of property crimes. † Id. at 340. SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM 712 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:703 and when death sentences are commuted. 27 A study by Joanna Shepherd, based on data from all states from 1997 to 1999, finds that each death sentence deters 4. 5 murders and that an execution deters 3 additional murders. 8 Her study also investigates the contested question whether executions deter crimes of passion and murders by intimates. Although intuition might suggest that such crimes cannot be deterred, her own finding is clear: all categories of murder are deterred by capital punishment. 29 The deterrent effect of the death penalty is also found to be a function of the length of waits on death row, with a murder deterred for every 2. 75 years of reduction in the period before execution. 30 Importantly, this study finds that the deterrent effect of capital punishment protects African-American victims even more than whites. 1 In the period between 1972 and 1976, the Supreme Court produced an effective moratorium on capital punishment, and an extensive unpublished study exploits that fact to estimate the deterrent effect. Using state-level data from 1977 to 1999, the authors make before-and-after comparisons, focusing on the murder rate in each state before and after the death penalty was suspended and reinstated. 32 The authors find a substantial deterrent effect: â€Å"[T]he data indicate that murder rates increased immediately after the moratorium was imposed and decreased directly after the moratorium was lifted, providing support for the deterrence hypothesis. 33 A recent study offers more refined findings. 34 Disaggregating the data on a state-by-state basis, Joanna Shepherd finds that the nationwide deterrent effect of capital punishment is entirely driven by only six states—and that no deterrent effect can be found in the twenty-one other states that have restored capital punishment. 35 What distinguishes the six from the twenty-one? The answer, she contends, lies in the fact that states showing a deterrent effect are executing more people than states that are not. In fact the data show a 27. Mocan & Gittings, supra note 9, at 453, 456. 8. Shepherd, Murders of Passion, supra note 9, at 308. 29. Id. at 305. Shepherd notes: Many researchers have argued that some types of murders cannot be deterred: they assert that murders committed during arguments or oth er crime-of-passion moments are not premeditated and therefore undeterrable. My results indicate that this assertion is wrong: the rates of crime-of-passion and murders by intimates—crimes previously believed to be undeterrable—all decrease in execution months. Id. 30. Id. at 283. 31. Id. at 308. 32. Hashem Dezhbakhsh & Joanna M.Shepherd, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Evidence from a â€Å"Judicial Experiment,† at tbls. 3-4 (Am. Law & Economics Ass’n Working Paper No. 18, 2004), available at http://law. bepress. com/cgi/viewcontent. cgi? article=1017&context=alea (last visited Dec. 1, 2005). 33. Id. at 3-4. 34. Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization, supra note 9. 35. Id. at 207. SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM December 2005] IS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT MORALLY REQUIRED? 713 â€Å"threshold effect†: deterrence is found in states that had at least nine total executions between 1977 and 1996.In states below th at threshold, no deterrence effect can be found. 36 This finding is intuitively plausible. Unless executions reach a certain level, murderers may act as if the death penalty is so improbable as not to be worthy of concern. 37 Shepherd’s main lesson is that once the level of executions reaches a certain level, the deterrent effect of capital punishment is substantial. All in all, the recent evidence of a deterrent effect from capital punishment seems impressive, especially in light of its â€Å"apparent power and unanimity. 38 But in studies of this kind, it is hard to control for confounding variables, and reasonable doubts inevitably remain. Most broadly, skeptics are likely to question the mechanisms by which capital punishment is said to have a deterrent effect. In the skeptical view, many murderers lack a clear sense of the likelihood and perhaps even the existence of executions in their states; further problems for the deterrence claim are introduced by the fact that ca pital punishment is imposed infrequently and after long delays.Emphasizing the weakness of the deterrent signal, Steven Levitt has suggested that â€Å"it is hard to believe that fear of execution would be a driving force in a rational criminal’s calculus in modern America. †39 And, of course, some criminals do not act rationally: many murders are committed in a passionate state that does not lend itself to an all-things-considered analysis on the part of perpetrators. More narrowly, it remains possible that the recent findings will be exposed as statistical artifacts or found to rest on flawed econometric methods.Work by Richard Berk, based on his independent review of the state-level panel data from Mocan and Gittings, offers multiple objections to those authors’ finding of deterrence. 40 For example, Texas executes more people than any other state, and when Texas is removed from the data, the evidence of deterrence is severely weakened. 41 Removal of the appa rent â€Å"outlier state[s]† that execute the largest numbers of people seems to eliminate the finding of deterrence 36. Id. at 239-41. 37.Less intuitively, Shepherd finds that in thirteen of the states that had capital punishment but executed few people, capital punishment actually increased the murder rate. She attributes this puzzling result to what she calls the â€Å"brutalization effect,† by which capital punishment devalues human life and teaches people about the legitimacy of vengeance. Id. at 40-41. 38. See Weisberg, supra note 18, at 159. 39. See Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 175 (2004). 0. See Berk, supra note 16; Deterrence and the Death Penalty, supra note 16, at 6-12. 41. Berk, supra note 16, at 320. It has also been objected that the studies do not take account of the availability of sentences that involve life without the possibility of paro le; such sentences might have a deterrent effect equal to or beyond that of capital punishment. See Deterrence and the Death Penalty, supra note 16. A response to Berk can found in Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization, supra note 9. SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM 714STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:703 altogether. 42 Berk concludes that the findings of Mocan and Gittings are driven by six states with more than five executions each year. Berk, however, proceeds by presenting data in graphic form; he offers no regression analyses in support of his criticism. These concerns about the evidence should be taken as useful cautions. At the level of theory, it is plausible that if criminals are fully rational, they should not be deterred by infrequent and much-delayed executions; the deterrent signal may well be too weak to affect their behavior.But suppose that like most people, criminals are boundedly rational, assessing probabilities with the aid of heurist ics. 43 If executions are highly salient and cognitively available, some prospective murderers will overestimate their likelihood, and will be deterred as a result. Other prospective murderers will not pay much attention to the fact that execution is unlikely, focusing instead on the badness of the outcome (execution) rather than its low probability. 44 Few murderers are likely to assess the deterrent signal by multiplying the harm of execution against its likelihood.If this is so, then the deterrent signal will be larger than might be suggested by the product of that multiplication. Levitt’s theoretical claim assumes that prospective murderers are largely rational in their reaction to the death penalty and its probability—standing by itself, a plausible conjecture but no more. As for the recent data, it is true that evidence of deterrence is reduced or eliminated through the removal of Texas and other states in which executions are most common and in which evidence of deterrence is strongest. 5 But removal of those states seems to be an odd way to resolve the contested questions. States having the largest numbers of executions are most likely to deter, and it does not seem to make sense to exclude those states as â€Å"outliers. †46 By way of comparison, imagine a study attempting to determine what characteristics of baseball teams most increase the chance of winning the World Series. Imagine also a criticism of the study, parallel to Berk’s, which complained that data about the New York Yankees should be thrown out, on the ground that the Yankees have won so many times as to be â€Å"outliers. This would be an odd idea, because empiricists must go where the evidence is; in the case of capital punishment, the outliers provide much of the relevant evidence. Recall here Shepherd’s finding, compatible with the analysis of some skeptics, that the deterrent effect occurs only in states in which there is some threshold 42. Berk, supra note 16, at 320-24; Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization, supra note 9. 43. On bounded rationality in general, see RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI-RATIONAL ECONOMICS (1991). 44.See Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses, and Electric Shocks: On the Affective Psychology of Risk, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 185, 188 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L. J. 61 (2002). 45. See Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization, supra note 9. 46. Id. SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM December 2005] IS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT MORALLY REQUIRED? 715 number of executions. 47 But let us suppose, plausibly, that the evidence of deterrence remains inconclusive.Even so, it would not follow that the death penalty as such fails to deter. As Shepherd also finds in her most recent study,48 more frequent executions, carried out in closer proximity to convictions, are predicted to amplify the deterrent signal for both ration al and boundedly rational criminals. We can go further. A degree of doubt, with respect to the current system, need not be taken to suggest that existing evidence is irrelevant for purposes of policy and law.In regulation as a whole, it is common to embrace some version of the precautionary principle49—the idea that steps should be taken to prevent significant harm even if cause-and-effect relationships remain unclear and even if the risk is not likely to come to fruition. Even if we reject strong versions of the precautionary principle,50 it hardly seems sensible that governments should ignore evidence demonstrating a significant possibility that a certain step will save large numbers of innocent lives.For capital punishment, critics often seem to assume that evidence on deterrent effects should be ignored if reasonable questions can be raised about the evidence’s reliability. But as a general rule, this is implausible. In most contexts, the existence of legitimate qu estions is hardly an adequate reason to ignore evidence of severe harm. If it were, many environmental controls would be in serious jeopardy. 51 We do not mean to suggest that government should commit what many people consider to be, prima facie, a serious moral wrong simply on the basis of speculation that this action will do some good.But a degree of reasonable doubt need not be taken as sufficient to doom a form of punishment if there is a significant possibility that it will save large numbers of lives. It is possible that capital punishment saves lives on net, even if it has zero deterrent effect. A life-life tradeoff may arise in several ways. One possibility, the one we focus on here, is that capital punishment deters homicides. Another possibility is that capital punishment has no deterrent effect, but saves lives just 7. See id. 48. Id. 49. For overviews of the precautionary principle and related issues, see INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (Tim O’Riordan & J ames Cameron eds. , 1994); ARIE TROUWBORST, EVOLUTION AND STATUS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002). 50. See, e. g. , Julian Morris, Defining the Precautionary Principle, in RETHINKING RISK AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (Julian Morris ed. , 2000). 51.Indeed, those skeptical of capital punishment invoke evidence to the effect that capital punishment did not deter, and argue, plausibly, that it would be a mistake to wait for definitive evidence before ceasing with a punishment that could not be shown to reduce homicide. See Lempert, supra note 20, at 1222-24. This is a kind of precautionary principle, arguing against the most aggressive forms of punishment if the evidence suggested that they did not deter. We are suggesting the possibility of a mirror-image precautionary principle when the evidence goes the other way. SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE 58 STAN.L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM 716 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:703 by incapacitating those who would otherwise k ill again in the future. 52 Consider those jurisdictions that eschew capital punishment altogether. What sanction can such jurisdictions really apply to those who have already been sentenced to life in prison without parole? Sentences of this sort may take more lives overall by increasing the number of essentially unpunishable withinprison homicides of guards and fellow inmates. 53 Many murderers are killed in prison even in states that lack the death penalty. 4 And if murderers are eventually paroled into the general population, some of them will kill again. Overall, it is quite possible that the permanent incapacitation of murderers through execution might save lives on net. A finding that capital punishment deters—and deterrence is our focus here—is sufficient but not necessary to find a life-life tradeoff. In any event, our goal here is not to reach a final judgment about the evidence. It is to assess capital punishment given the assumption of a substantial deterre nt effect.In what follows, therefore, we will stipulate to the validity of the evidence and consider its implications for morality and law. Those who doubt the evidence might ask themselves how they would assess the moral questions if they were ultimately convinced that life-life tradeoffs were actually involved—as, for example, in hostage situations in which officials are authorized to use deadly force to protect the lives of innocent people. II. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: MORAL FOUNDATIONS AND FOUR OBJECTIONS Assume, then, that capital punishment does save a significant number of innocent lives.On what assumptions should that form of punishment be deemed morally unacceptable, rather than morally obligatory? Why should the deaths of those convicted of capital murder, an overwhelmingly large fraction of whom are guilty in fact, be considered a more serious moral wrong than the deaths of a more numerous group who are certainly innocents? We consider, and ultimately reject, several re sponses. Our first general contention is that opposition to capital punishment trades on a form of the distinction between acts and omissions.Whatever the general force of that distinction, its application to government systematically fails, because government is a distinctive kind of moral agent. Our second general contention is that, apart from direct state involvement, the features that make capital punishment morally objectionable to its critics are also features of the very murders that capital punishment deters. The principal difference, on the empirical assumptions we are making, is that in a legal regime without capital punishment far more people die, and those people are innocent of any 2. See Ronald J. Allen & Amy Shavell, Further Reflections on the Guillotine, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 625, 630-31 (2005). 53. See id. at 630 n. 9. 54. See Katz et al. , supra note 26, at 340. SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM December 2005] IS CAPITAL PUNISHME NT MORALLY REQUIRED? 717 wrongdoing. No one denies that arbitrariness in the system of capital punishment is a serious problem. But even if the existing system is viewed in its worst light, it involves far less arbitrariness than does the realm of homicide.Let us begin, however, with foundational issues. A. Morality and Death On a standard view, it is impossible to come to terms with the moral questions about capital punishment without saying something about the foundations of moral judgments. We will suggest, however, that sectarian commitments at the foundational level are for the most part irrelevant to the issues here. If it is stipulated that substantial deterrence exists, both consequentialist and deontological accounts of morality will or should converge upon the view that capital punishment is morally obligatory.Consequentialists will come to that conclusion because capital punishment minimizes killings overall. Deontologists will do so because an opposition to killing is, b y itself, indeterminate in the face of life-life tradeoffs; because a legal regime with capital punishment has a strong claim to be more respectful of life’s value than does a legal regime lacking capital punishment; and because modern deontologists typically subscribe to a consequentialist override or escape hatch, one that makes otherwise mpermissible actions obligatory if necessary to prevent many deaths—precisely what we are assuming is true of capital punishment. Only those deontologists who both insist upon a strong distinction between state actions and state omissions and who reject a consequentialist override will believe the deterrent effect of capital punishment to be irrelevant in principle. Suppose that we accept consequentialism and believe that government actions should be evaluated in terms of their effects on aggregate welfare.If we do so, the evidence of deterrence strongly supports a moral argument in favor of the death penalty—a form of punish ment that, by hypothesis, seems to produce a net gain in overall welfare. Of course, there are many complications here; for example, the welfare of many people might increase as a result of knowing that capital punishment exists, and the welfare of many other people might decrease for the same reason. A full consequentialist calculus would require a more elaborate assessment than we aim to provide here.The only point is that if capital punishment produces significantly fewer deaths on balance, there should be a strong consequentialist presumption on its behalf; any argument against capital punishment, on consequentialist grounds, will face a steep uphill struggle. To be sure, it is also possible to imagine forms of consequentialism that reject welfarism as implausibly reductionist and see violations of rights as part of the set of consequences that must be taken into account in deciding what to SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 03 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM 718 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol . 58:703 do. 55 For some such consequentialists, killings are, under ordinary circumstances, a violation of rights, and this point is highly relevant to any judgment about killings. But even if the point is accepted, capital punishment may be required, not prohibited, on consequentialist grounds, simply because and to the extent that it minimizes rights violations. Private murders also violate rights, and the rights-respecting consequentialist must take those actions into account.But imagine that we are deontologists, believing that actions by government and others should not be evaluated in consequentialist terms; how can capital punishment be morally permissible, let alone obligatory? For some deontologists, capital punishment is obligatory for moral reasons alone. 56 But suppose, as other deontologists believe, that under ordinary circumstances, the state’s killing of a human being is a wrong and that its wrongness does not depend on an inquiry into whether the action prod uces a net increase in welfare.For many critics of capital punishment, a deontological intuition is central; evidence of deterrence is irrelevant because moral wrongdoing by the state is not justified even if it can be defended on utilitarian grounds. Compare a situation in which a state seeks to kill an innocent person, knowing that the execution will prevent a number of private killings; deontologists believe that the unjustified execution cannot be supported even if the state is secure in its knowledge of the execution’s beneficial effects. Of course, it is contentious to claim that capital punishment is a moral wrong.But if it is, then significant deterrence might be entirely beside the point. It is simply true that many intuitive objections to capital punishment rely on a belief of this kind: just as execution of an innocent person is a moral wrong, one that cannot be justified on consequentialist grounds, so too the execution of a guilty person is a moral wrong, whateve r the evidence shows. Despite all this, our claims here do not depend on accepting consequentialism or rejecting the deontological objection to evaluating unjustified killings in consequentialist terms.The argument is instead that by itself and in the abstract, this objection is indeterminate on the moral status of capital punishment. To the extent possible, we intend to bracket the most fundamental questions and to suggest that whatever one’s view of the foundations of morality, the objection to the death penalty is difficult to sustain under the empirical assumptions that we have traced. Taken in its most sympathetic light, a deontological objection to capital punishment is unconvincing if states that refuse to impose the death penalty produce, by that 55.Amartya Sen, Rights and Agency, 11 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 15-19 (1982). 56. See Pojman, supra note 4, at 58-59. As noted below, the case of Israel is a good test for such deontologists; Israel does not impose the death penal ty, in part on the ground that executions of terrorists would likely increase terrorism. Do deontologists committed to capital punishment believe that Israel is acting immorally? In our view, they ought not to do so, at least if the empirical assumption is right and if the protection of lives is what morality requires. SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE 58 STAN.L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM December 2005] IS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT MORALLY REQUIRED? 719 very refusal, significant numbers of additional deaths. Recall the realm of homicide: for deontologists who emphasize life’s value and object to the death penalty, the problem is acute if the refusal to impose that penalty predictably leads to a significant number of additional murders. In a hostage situation, police officers are permitted to kill (execute) those who have taken hostages if this step is reasonably deemed necessary to save those who have been taken hostage.If the evidence of deterrence is convincing, why is capital punishment so different in principle? Of course, these points might be unresponsive to those who believe that execution of a guilty person is morally equivalent to execution of an innocent person and not properly subject to a recognition of life-life tradeoffs. We will explore this position in more detail below. And we could envision a form of deontology that refuses any exercise in aggregation—one that would refuse to authorize, or compel, a violation of rights even if the violation is necessary to prevent a significantly larger number of rights violations.But most modern deontologists reject this position, instead admitting a consequentialist override to baseline deontological prohibitions. 57 Although the threshold at which the consequentialist override is triggered varies with different accounts, we suggest below that if each execution deters some eighteen murders, the override is plausibly triggered. To distill these points, the only deontological accounts that are inconsistent with our argument are those that both (1) embrace a distinction between state actions and state omissions and (2) reject a consequentialist override.To those who subscribe to this complex of views, and who consider capital punishment a violation of rights, our argument will not be convincing. In the end, however, we believe that it is difficult to sustain the set of moral assumptions that would bar capital punishment if it is the best means of preventing significant numbers of innocent deaths. Indeed, we believe that many of those who think that they hold those assumptions are motivated by other considerations—especially a failure to give full weight to statistical lives—on which we focus in Part III. B.Acts and Omissions A natural response to our basic concern would invoke the widespread intuition that capital punishment involves intentional state â€Å"action,† while the failure to deter private murders is merely an â€Å"omission† by the state. In our view, this appealing and intuitive line of argument goes rather badly wrong. The critics of capital punishment have been led astray by uncritically applying the act/omission distinction to a regulatory setting. Their position condemns the â€Å"active† infliction of death by governments but does not condemn the â€Å"inactive† production of death that comes from the refusal to maintain a system 57.For an overview, see Larry Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893, 898-901 (2000). SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM 720 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:703 of capital punishment. The basic problem is that even if this selective condemnation can be justified at the level of individual behavior, it is difficult to defend for governments. 58 A great deal of work has to be done to explain why â€Å"inactive,† but causal, government decisions should not be part of the moral calculus.Suppose that we endorse the deontological pos ition that it is wrong to take human lives, even if overall welfare is promoted by taking them. Why does the system of capital punishment violate that position, if the failure to impose capital punishment also takes lives? Perhaps our argument about unjustified selectivity is blind to morally relevant factors that condemn capital punishment and that buttress the act/omission distinction in this context. There are two possible points here, one involving intention and the other involving causation.First, a government (acting through agents) that engages in capital punishment intends to take lives; it seeks to kill. A government that does not engage in capital punishment, and therefore provides less deterrence, does not intend to kill. The deaths that result are the unintended and unsought byproduct of an effort to respect life. Surely— it might be said—this is a morally relevant difference. Second, a government that inflicts capital punishment ensures a simple and direct causal chain between its own behavior and the taking of human lives.When a government rejects capital punishment, the causal chain is much more complex; the taking of human lives is an indirect consequence of the government’s decision, one that is mediated by the actions of a murderer. The government authorizes its agents to inflict capital punishment, but it does not authorize private parties to murder; indeed, it forbids murder. Surely that is a morally relevant difference, too. We will begin, in Part II. B. 1, with questions about whether the act/omission distinction is conceptually intelligible in regulatory settings.Here the suggestion is that there just is no way to speak or think coherently about government â€Å"actions† as opposed to government â€Å"omissions,† because government cannot help but act, in some way or another, when choosing how individuals are to be regulated. In Part II. B. 2, we suggest that the distinction between government acts and omissions, even if conceptually coherent, is not morally relevant to the question of capital punishment. Some governmental actions are morally obligatory, and some governmental omissions are blameworthy.In this setting, we suggest, government is morally obligated to adopt capital punishment and morally at fault if it declines to do so. 1. Is the act/omission distinction coherent with respect to government? In our view, any effort to distinguish between acts and omissions goes 58. Compare debates over going to war: Some pacifists insist, correctly, that acts of war will result in the loss of life, including civilian life. But a refusal to go to war will often result in the loss of life, including civilian life.SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 1/9/2006 10:51:05 AM December 2005] IS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT MORALLY REQUIRED? 721 wrong by overlooking the distinctive features of government as a moral agent. If correct, this point has broad implications for criminal and civil law. Whate ver the general status of the act/omission distinction as a matter of moral philosophy,59 the distinction is least impressive when applied to government, because the most plausible underlying considerations do not apply to official actors. 0 The most fundamental point is that, unlike individuals, governments always and necessarily face a choice between or among possible policies for regulating third parties. The distinction between acts and omissions may not be intelligible in this context, and even if it is, the distinction does not make a morally relevant difference. Most generally, government is in the business of creating permissions and prohibitions. When it explicitly or implicitly authorizes private action, it is not omitting to do anything or refusing to act. 1 Moreover, the distinction between authorized and unauthorized private action—for example, private killing— becomes obscure when the government formally forbids private action but chooses a set of policy instruments that do not adequately or fully discourage it. To be sure, a system of punishments that only weakly deters homicide, relative to other feasible punishments, does not quite authorize homicide, but that system is not properly characterized as an omission, and little turns on whether it can be so characterized.Suppose, for example, that government fails to characterize certain actions—say, sexual harassment—as tortious or violative of civil rights law and that it therefore permits employers to harass employees as they choose or to discharge employees for failing to submit to sexual harassment. It would be unhelpful to characterize the result as a product of governmental â€Å"inaction. † If employers are permitted to discharge employees for refusing to submit to sexual harassment, it is because the law is allocating certain entitlements to employers rather than employees. Or consider the context of ordinary torts.When Homeowner B sues Factory A over air pollution, a decision not to rule for Homeowner B is not a form of inaction: it is the allocation to Factory A of a property right to pollute. In such cases, an apparent government omission is an action simply because it is an allocation of legal rights. Any decision that allocates such rights, by creating entitlements 59. For discussion of the philosophical controversy over acts and omissions, see generally RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993); Frances M.Kamm, Abortion and the Value of Life: A Discussion of Life’s Dominion, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 160 (1995) (reviewing DWORKIN, supra); Tom Stacy, Acts, Omissions, and the Necessity of Killing Innocents, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 481 (2002). 60. Here we proceed in the spirit of Robert Goodin by treating government as a distinctive sort of moral agen

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Different reactions Essay How quickly a reaction happens is called the rate of reaction. Chemical reactions take place when two or more chemicals react with one another by colliding with each other. The increase in temperature increases the amount of collisions between particles, this fastens the reaction. If a reaction has a low rate that means the molecules combine at a slower speed than a reaction with a high rate. Particles need a minimum amount of kinetic movement if they are going to react when they collide. This is known as Activation energy. The collision theory is the idea that different reactions happen at different rates. Reactions that occur slowly have a lower rate of reaction. Fast reactions are due to an increase of collisions; slow reactions are due to decrease in collisions. Reactions that happen quickly have a high rate of reaction (e. g. explosions). Concentration: The concentration of a solution is how strong the solution is. A stronger acid contains more acid particles and less water particles than a weaker acid. Increasing the concentration of a solution leads to more collisions (greater frequency of collisions) so the rate of the reaction goes up. With a more concentrated acid, the number of acid particles is greater, so the number of collisions is greater and the rate of the reaction is higher (faster. ) Changing the concentration of the acid does not change how quickly the particles are moving (i. e. it doesnt increase the amount of energy they have. ) Temperature: When we increase the temperature at which a reaction is taking place, the particles move more quickly. At a lower temperature, the number of collisions is lower because the particles are moving more slowly. Also when a collision occurs, there is less chance of a reaction taking place because the movement energy in the particles is less. At a higher temperature, the number of collisions is greater because the particles are moving more quickly. When a collision occurs, there is more chance of a reaction taking place because the movement energy in the particles is greater. Gas pressure: Pressure affects the rate of reaction, especially when you look at gases. When you increase the pressure, the molecules have less space in which they can move. That greater concentration of molecules increases the number of collisions. When you decrease the pressure, molecules dont hit each other as often. The lower pressure decreases the rate of reaction. (2) Catalyst: Different catalysts speed up different reactions. The table shows some common catalysts: A catalyst provides a surface on which the reaction can take place. This increases the number of collisions between the particles of the substances that are reacting. A catalyst lowers the activation energy (the minimum amount of energy needed for a reaction to take place). This means that the particles can react with less energy than they needed before the catalyst was added. (3) Surface area of particles: By increasing the surface area of the reactants, there are a higher number of reaction sites. Reaction sites are specific sites on molecules at which reactions occur. Increasing the number of reaction sites increases the number of total collisions. The greater the frequency of total collisions, the greater the frequency of e.ffective collisions. If the frequency of effective collisions increases, so does the reaction rate. Introduction/Aim. In this investigation, I am finding out how concentration affects the rate of reaction between Hydrochloric acid and Sodium Thiosulphate. I am going to measure the rate of reaction when hydrochloric acid is added to sodium thiosulfate. When sodium thiosulfate and Hydrochloric Acid are mixed, a yellow precipitate of sulphur is produced. The solution becomes increasingly difficult to see through as more and more sulphur is formed. This is how I plan to measure the rate of reaction. I will place a paper with a black cross underneath the solution and will stop the clock when the cross can no longer be seen. I will find out the answer by doing a preliminary test to experiment this, I will then compare and discuss the results in my evaluation then I will also state how this experiment I done could be improved, in my conclusion. But before doing the real experiment I will carry out a preliminary test. What is a Preliminary test? This is a test that is done before the real test. It gives an idea of the real thing; through the test you can make changes to make sure the real one is fair and reliable e. g. changing equipment or concentration of sodium thiosulfate solution. A preliminary test is more of a trial than an experiment – to find out if the equipment/method or even experiment works. A preliminary test is generally a baseline for further testing and development. It helps you refine ideas and change key concepts of the experiment. Prediction: Knowing the information above, I predict that as the concentration of the Sodium Thiosulphate increases, the rate of reaction will also increase. This means that the rate/concentration graph I compile from my experiments results will have a positive correlation. I believe this will happen because, according to the collision theory, as the concentration of a solution is increased the number of particles inside the solution increases. If the number of particles inside the solution is increased it makes collisions with reacting particles more likely. Also, I believe that the time/concentration graph will have a negative correlation because if my prediction is true, as the concentration increases the time taken for the reaction to take place will decrease. Preliminary Experiment: I did a preliminary experiment to get used to the sequence of events. I got to know all the apparatus and the method. Word Equation for the reaction: Sodium Thiosulfate + Hydrochloric acid Sodium Chloride + Sulphur + sulphur dioxide + water Ionic equation for reaction: 2Na+ + S2O32- + 2H+ + 2Cl- 2Na+ + 2Cl- + SO2 (g) + S + H2O (l) Balanced Symbol Equation for the reaction: Products Reactants Na2S203 (aq) + 2HCl (aq) 2NaCl (aq) + S (s) +SO2 (g) +H20 (l) I only did the experiment one, not three times so I did not get an average time for each concentration. I made sure the volume of Sodium Thiosulfate solution each time equalled to 10cm3 . The one thing I kept consistent was 10cm3 of Hydrochloric acid. I varied the concentration of the Sodium Thiosulfate and water. Below is a results table for my preliminary experiment. Preliminary Table Volume of water (cm3) Volume of Sodium Thiosulfate (cm3) Concentration (M) Volume of Hydrochloric Acid (cm3) Concentration (M) Time taken (seconds)Â   Preliminary method: 1. If you have not already done so, put on your goggles and gloves. 2. Place the paper with an X onto a flat surface and put a conical flask on top. 3. Measure 9 cm3 of sodium thiosulphate using a pipette and put it into a flask. Then measure 1 cm3 of water using a different pipet. 4. Then measure 10 cm3 of hydrochloric acid using a measuring cylinder. 5. Add first the acid then water and place a ball of cotton wool on top of the flask to block the formed gas from getting into the air. When acid and water is added, immediately start the timer. 6. Look down at the cross from above the flask. When the cross disappears, stop the timer and note the time, recording it in the table. 7. Repeat this process using different concentrations of sodium thiosulpahte solution with water as shown in the table above. 8. Carefully pour the solution into the sink straight after each test. Preliminary Safety: Safety is a key aspect to any experiment. There are a lot of safety issues we must abide when performing this experiment. A key safety aspect was that we covered the top of the conical flask with cotton wool, making sure no gas escapes the air we breathe into as sulphur dioxide; one of the products formed from the experiment is a toxic gas. I also decided to wear goggles to protect my eyes from the acid splashing, squirting or any way entering my eye. Also be sure to tie hair back because if the sodium thiosulphate makes contact with my hair it could dye it blonde (bleach it) or if it comes into contact with my skin it would turn white and peel off. Another precaution to take measure of is wearing gloves to protect your skin as hydrochloric acid is corrosive. Afterwards, when you have done your experiment thoroughly wash away all apparatus used and pour the solution down the sink. Apparatus: 1. Sodium Thiosulphate solution – (This is the variable factor being studied in the reaction) 1. Hydrochloric Acid 2. Water 3. Conical Flask – (to put both the hydrochloric acid and sodium thiosulphate into. ) 4. 3 Pipettes – (one for the hydrochloric acid and one for the sodium thiosulphate and one for water; this allows you to easily transfer the liquids. ) 5. Cotton – (this blocks the top of the conical flask to make sure sulphur dioxide the toxic gas produced doesn’t escape. ) 6. A paper marked with an x – (to be certain when to stop the timer. ) 7. Stop watch/Timer – (to stop the time when ‘X’ is not visible. ) 8. Goggles – (to protect your eyes from acid entering the eyes – for safety measurements. ) 9. Gloves – (protects your skin from hydrochloric acid; corrosive. ) 10. 2 Measuring cylinders’ (to measure the volume of the acids. ) Prediction: I predict that the greater the concentration of Sodium Thiosulfate Solution, the faster the chemical reaction will take place. Therefore, the cross will disappear more quickly due to the cloudiness of the solution. If solutions of reacting particles are made to be more concentrated, there are a higher number of particles reacting. Meaning collisions between Hydrochloric Acid and Sodium Thiosulfate Solution are more likely to occur. All this can be justified by the full understanding of the collision theory itself: For a reaction to occur particles have to collide with each other. Only a small per cent result in a reaction. This is due to the energy barrier to overcome. Only particles with enough energy to overcome the barrier will react after colliding. The minimum energy that a particle must have to overcome the barrier is called the activation energy, or Ea.